Walter's observations about the early days of the Voice of America -- which coincided with the beginning, too, of the practice of modern U.S. public diplomacy -- are revealing. He vividly recalls the frantic atmosphere of the war years, and the role of VOA's founding fathers -- Robert Sherwood and John Houseman -- in creating programming and laying the foundations for VOA's future. He also describes how the British encouraged their U.S. counterparts -- including FDR himself -- to split genuine public diplomacy activities including VOA from any "gray" or "black" propaganda operations carried out by the Office of Strategic Services -- the OSS. (Walter wrote at greater length about this same period in his 2009 article entitled The Voice of America: Origins and Recollections.)
"The Atmosphere was Warlike, as if You Were in the Middle of a Battle."
As far as both the leadership and the rank and file is
concerned, I can best describe [the atmosphere at the VOA] by saying that these were people who were
deeply dedicated to their jobs and regarded it as a very, very important
adjunct to military operations.
These people worked 12, 16 hours a day. For them, they lived through the war. You had the feeling that you were in
the battle, they were so excited. I will tell you…on the day in February of 1943, when
Stalingrad was finally rid of all Germans, I was in the news desk, and there
were tickers there, the Reuters ticker, AP, UP and INS and I remember when the
news came through on the ticker that Stalingrad had finally been liberated, the
whole of the news desk got up and applauded. That was later described by McCarthy, “there you are, those
were all Communists. “ Because
they applauded the Soviet victory.
That was not the case. The
Soviet Union was an ally of the United States, and when they won a battle, it
was reducing pressure on American troops.
So you asked about the atmosphere.
The atmosphere was warlike, as if you were in the middle of a
battle. The only thing that didn’t
happen you weren’t shot at. That
was the feeling of people they were excited, they were full of enthusiasm. That goes from number one – Donovan and
Sherwood – whom I did not know. I
mean I was, in 1942, twenty-five years old. I was a very, very junior person.
"...And Don't Take the Train. Fly!"
When war broke out, on December 7, 1941, the Coordinator of
Information run by Colonel “Wild Bill” Donovan, later General Donovan, had a
subsection called FIS, the Foreign Information Service, and it was headed by
Robert Sherwood, who was Franklin Roosevelt’s speechwriter. He was in Washington, of course. He had the idea that whatever
information program, external international information program was to be created,
should be located in New York. So one day Bob Sherwood took a train and
went to New York and personally looked for quarters, and found four floors, on
270 Madison Ave. in New York. And
he rented it.
Robert Sherwood |
He asked one of his good friends, Joseph Barnes, a very,
very intelligent person, had been Moscow correspondent of the New York Herald
Tribune, which then still existed.
Went to Harvard at the age of 14.
As I remember him, and I had very little to do with him, a very, very
nice person – he was asked to run the New York office. But he was not a radio man. It became very clear to Sherwood that
what they could do best would be to start a radio operation, because all of
other media, books and leaflets and so on was in some respects minor to having
a strong radio voice from the United States. So around Christmas 1941, he sent a telegram to John
Houseman, who was a director and producer in Hollywood, who spoke several
languages, was born in Romania of a British mother and an Alsatian father, and
asked him whether he would like to join.
And to show you the sign of the times, he told him in the telegram: “and
don’t take the train. Fly!” Because at that time, flying between
the two coasts was an exception, very much of an exception. If you had to go to Los Angeles from
New York, or you had to go to San Francisco, you went by train. Like the Trans-Siberian train. [Laughs.]
John Houseman |
…One of the things that came to my mind, and I’m sure to
hundreds of other people who were involved in this – the United States we don’t
have any transmitters. Yes, we did
have transmitters, but they belonged to private corporations. NBC, CBS had shortwave
transmitters. Westinghouse,
General Electric, Crosley Corporation -- they had broadcasting mostly in
Spanish and Portuguese for Latin America. But in the middle thirties, or I should say perhaps ‘37,
they all started already doing some German broadcasts, and some Italian, and
some French broadcasts. And they
continued. But they were not
United States governmental broadcasts.
And one thing for the record, and I’m happy to do this interview. The term Voice of America was invented
by Robert Sherwood. There are lots
of people who claim that they had invented it. But I know it was Bob Sherwood. And I think the term Voice of America was used in the
second week of broadcasting. Until
then, and I have that from a BBC file, the programs are called “America Calling
Europe.” And that in the three
languages: German, Italian and
French.
[The relationship with the British was] very close. As
soon as the war broke out, I remember two Britishers – one from the BBC, and
the other one from the PWE, Political Warfare Executive. After all, the British had already been
in this business for two years.
War started in Europe on September 1, 1939, and this was December ’41 –
so it’s two years and two months.
And they came over ostensibly to help. And indeed they helped, beautifully. But I cannot deny that the British at
the beginning and throughout the war, tried to claim an advisory role to us, in
both intelligence and information.
And I might add here that…the British were very helpful in dividing
intelligence from information.
When they came over and found the Coordinator of Information, and Mr.
Donovan was more interested in intelligence work, and particularly in black and
gray operations in the field of radio, rather than white – what we hand in mind
in the Voice of America – the British made it very clear, and even I think got
to Roosevelt, saying “You can’t run a program that combines intelligence and
information.” So, in June 1942,
Roosevelt divided the Coordinator of Information into the OWI and the OSS. From then on the Office of War
Information was clearly a white operation; and the OSS was clearly a gray and
black operation. And the OWI was
later, via the State Department, transformed into the U.S. Information Agency;
and OSS was later transformed into the Central Intelligency Agency.